A continuing controversy is whether U.S. securities laws are enforced against foreign firms, since public enforcement actions by the SEC are infrequent and often result in insignificant penalties. We examine private enforcement actions of U.S. securities laws and find that 269 securities class-action lawsuits were filed against foreign firms from 1996 to 2008. We document the severity of the penalties imposed on foreign firms and show that while firms paid a total of $9 billion to settle lawsuits brought against them, the monetary penalties levied by the market are even larger. During the three-day period surrounding the lawsuit filing date, there is a significant negative stock price reaction of -6.16%, which translates to an average loss of $392 million dollars. Aggregating over all firms, the total dollar loss is $73 billion. We further find that even foreign firms without significant U.S. assets experience significant valuation losses. Our results provide evidence that enforcement actions of U.S. securities laws against foreign firms are neither uncommon nor economically insignificant events.
Why do U.S. securities laws matter to non-U.S. firms? Evidence from private class-action lawsuits

Introduction
The severe economic penalties associated with weak securities laws and the corresponding difficulty in changing countries legal structure has led to a large literature that argues that listing in the U.S. provides non-U.S. firms with a market-based solution to increase investor protection. However, official SEC enforcement actions against foreign firms are rare and often result in insignificant penalties. This has led to significant debate regarding the ability of a U.S. listing to increase investor protection.
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That is, how can U.S. securities laws protect investors if the SEC does not enforce them?
This paper pursues two objectives: First, we re-examine securities law enforcement against foreign firms, concentrating on private securities law enforcement via U.S. class-action lawsuits. We find that one in every eight foreign firms trading in the U.S. are sued at least once during 1996-2008, providing evidence that U.S. securities laws are indeed enforced against foreign firms. The second objective is to measure the economic penalties that result from these private enforcement actions, focusing not only on the lawsuit settlement amounts but also on the losses borne by shareholders of firms caught violating U.S. securities laws. We find that while lawsuit settlements imposed on firms are large, the monetary penalties imposed by the market are even more economically severe.
The ability to overcome weak domestic investor protection by listing in the U.S. stems from work of Coase (1960) , where firms and investors write private contracts such as American Depositary Receipts that can increase the legal protection afforded to minority shareholders.
These theories of "functional convergence" or legal "bonding" first developed by Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999) argue that listing in the U.S. represents a market-based alternative to wholesale legal reform, since foreign firms listed in the U.S. become subject to U.S. securities laws.
However, the enforcement of U.S. securities laws is a necessary condition for the bonding hypothesis to hold, since ultimately, the only way to enforce a contract between managers and shareholders is through legal action of some kind (Johnson and Shleifer 2000) .
Prior studies that examine the enforcement of U.S. securities laws against foreign firms concentrated primarily on public enforcement actions initiated by the SEC. Most notably, Siegel (2005) shows that illegal asset taking by Mexican cross listed firms during the 1995 to 1999 financial crisis was rarely punished. Further, he documents that from 1934-2002, public enforcement actions by the SEC against foreign firms were extremely rare. While there exists some evidence that SEC enforcement activity has recently increased (Coffee 2007a, Silvers and Elgers 2010), Shnitser (2010) argues that even in more recent times foreign firms listed in the U.S. have benefited not only from a laxer set of rules than their U.S. domestic counterparts but also from a more forgiving public enforcement agency. 2 Moreover, prior research has focused strictly on the legal penalties imposed by regulators and courts to assess the economic consequences of U.S. enforcement actions. For example, Siegel (2005) shows that when the SEC did take legal action against foreign cross listed firms, they resulted in relatively inconsequential fines. Therefore, these findings suggest that the legal penalties associated with public enforcement actions of U.S. securities laws against foreign firms have largely been economically insignificant.
Taken together, the prior literature contains little evidence that U.S. securities laws are actually enforced in a meaningful way against foreign firms. Not surprisingly, the infrequent enforcement and insignificant penalties are the most often cited reasons why the bonding hypothesis may not hold (see, e.g., Licht (2003) , Pinegar and Ravichandran (2003) , Gozzi, Levine and Schmukler (2008) , Siegel (2009) , Litvak (2009) and Sarkissian and Schill (2009) ).
We depart from earlier studies in two ways: First, we focus on private enforcement actions of U.S. securities laws against foreign firms via class action lawsuits. We are motivated by the extensive literature that suggests that the U.S. legal system's vigorous private enforcement actions are an important supplement to public securities law enforcement. For example, Zingales (2004) argues that the unique U.S. system of private enforcement has three legal institutions that all serve to lower enforcement costs: contingency fees, punitive damages and class actions. As Coffee (2007a) notes, the vigorous U.S. system of private enforcement appears to extract greater annual aggregate sanctions than do its public enforcers and has no functional analog anywhere else in the world.
Second, we examine the penalties imposed by the market when foreign firms become targets of private enforcement actions of U.S. securities law violations, since prior research suggests that focusing on purely legal sanctions misses the majority of the penalties imposed.
For example, Karpoff and Lott (1993) and Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008) show that even when the fines imposed by the legal system are modest, the reputation loss imposed by the market on shareholders can be enormous. 3 Reputational losses result from reduced credibility in contracting with suppliers of capital and customers, a higher cost of capital, and managers devoting significant time to the investigation process at the expense of company business (Klein and Leffler (1981) , Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) , and Karpoff and Lott (1993) ).
3 Siegel (2005) observes that private securities class-action lawsuits from 1995 to 2001 cases most often ended in settlement, and class action shareholders often only received the value of the insurance in the settlement. Therefore, our analysis allows us to measure the market's assessment of the economic impact of U.S. securities law violations and their costs to foreign firms. Also important to note is that our sample period goes from 1996 through 2008 and therefore we are able to examine enforcement actions during the period that coincides with much of the prior empirical evidence in the cross listing literature.
We document 269 class action lawsuits alleging violation of U.S. securities laws were filed against foreign firms over the 1996 to 2008 time period, providing evidence that enforcement actions against foreign firms are not rare events. We find not only that the percentage of foreign firms being sued in the U.S. is similar to that of U.S. firms (11.79% versus 13.80%, respectively), but it is also increasing through time. Using a Cox Proportional Hazard model, we exploit our sample of enforcement actions against firms from 36 countries to examine how differences in domestic securities laws and firm characteristics affect U.S. securities law enforcement. We find that several of the determinants of the likelihood of being sued for foreign firms are similar to those for U.S. firms, further suggesting that foreign firms are in many ways targeted for enforcement actions similarly as U.S. firms. For example, large firms in litigation intensive industries are more likely to be targeted for class-action lawsuits, as well as firms with poor stock performance, high share turnover and high stock volatility. We also find some evidence that suggests that firms from countries with poor legal protection of minority shareholders as well as those with a larger presence in the U.S. are more likely to be sued.
Examining the severity of penalties imposed on foreign firms that are caught violating U.S. securities laws, we find that foreign firms paid a total of $9 billion to settle the lawsuits brought against them. While the lawsuit settlements imposed on firms are large, we further document that the monetary penalties imposed by the market are substantially larger. During the three-day period surrounding a lawsuit filing date, there is a significant negative stock price reaction of -6.16%. 4 In dollar terms, the mean dollar loss is $392 million and, aggregating over all firms the total dollar loss is $73 billion. Moreover, we find that even foreign firms without a significant U.S. presence experience significant valuation losses. Consequently, they dispel the myth that foreign firms with little assets in the U.S. are immune to U.S. securities law enforcement. Overall, our results provide evidence that private enforcement actions of U.S. securities laws are neither uncommon nor economically insignificant events.
Our findings make contributions to several strands of literature. First, our results are important in documenting an enforcement mechanism that allows foreign firms to bond themselves to U.S. securities laws. As discussed earlier, previous research has failed to find that U.S. securities laws are enforced against foreign firms, resulting in a "enforcement puzzle" that calls into question the large literature that most often attributes the positive economic consequences of U.S. cross listings to the legal bonding hypothesis. Our results provide a potential solution to this puzzle by showing that U.S. securities laws were indeed enforced vigorously with significant legal and market penalties. Coupled with prior literature that shows that listing in the U.S. improves the corporate governance of foreign firms (see, e.g. Lel and Miller 2008) , our findings are consistent with the notion that private enforcement actions deter managers from expropriating minority shareholders. Therefore, our findings also add to the debate in the literature regarding the ability of private class action lawsuits to deter securities fraud (Coffee 2006) . 4 In robustness tests we show that sued firms that are dual listed also experience negative abnormal returns in their local market stock price. 5 Since the large penalties of securities class action lawsuits are borne primarily by shareholders rather than managers, whether they achieve an optimal level of managerial deterrence for their sometimes massive costs is controversial.
Our findings on the economic consequences of U.S. securities class action lawsuits also have implications for the even larger questions regarding where the world's issuers will trade, who invests in them, and what these issuers disclose to the public (Fox 2010), since the fear of U.S. securities class action lawsuits have been suggested by both academics and policy makers as one of the most important deterrents to foreign firms listing in the U.S. National Australia Bank Ltd. seemingly lowered the U.S. litigation risk faced by foreign firms by striking down F-cubed lawsuits filed by foreign domiciled investors buying shares of foreign companies on foreign exchanges (see, Licht, Li and Siegel (2011) , and Gagnon and Karolyi (2011)). However, almost immediately after the Supreme Court ruling, the U.S. Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 which attempted to reinstate the wide ranging ability of the SEC and Department of Justice to enforce U.S. securities laws against foreign firms, even those not listed in the United States. In 2008, the SEC amended rule 12g3-2(b) in order to increase the competitive position of U.S. capital markets which led depository banks to involuntarily cross list over 900 foreign firms in the U.S. OTC markets, potentially subjecting them to U.S. securities law enforcement (Iliev, Miller and Roth (2011) ). 6 See, e.g., Coffee (2007b) . In addition, the Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Market Regulation (November 30, 2006 ) also argues that the relative uncompetitive position of U.S. capital market due in part to the potential for class action lawsuits against foreign firms trading here: (p.5) "there can be no denying that securities class actions do not exist in other major markets or that the level of enforcement in these markets is lower". 7 Fernandes, Lel and Miller (2010) document that many of the firms that chose to leave U.S. capital markets after the passage of SEC Rule 12h-6 (in 2007) did so after being the target of U.S. securities class-action lawsuits. For more details on 12h-6 also see Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2010) .
While the ultimate impact of these changes to U.S. securities laws has yet to unfold, our results are important in that they provide direct evidence on the economic magnitude of the fines and penalties foreign firms face if they are the target of a U.S. securities class action lawsuit.
Our findings also provide new evidence to the broader literature that examines the ability of firm and security level contracts to overcome the deficiencies of country level investor protection laws. For example, the models of Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) and Bergman and Nicolaievsky (2007) predict that contract enforcement is a key component in the ability of firm and security level adaptations to improve investor protection in weak legal regimes. Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001) show that enforcement of securities laws by the courts is essential to investor protection. Our findings provide empirical support that contracts with international enforcement provisions, such as ADRs that are subject to U.S. private class-action lawsuits, are indeed enforceable. This suggests that security level Coasian adaptations can indeed be used to overcome weak investor protection laws in a country.
Finally, our results contribute to the large literature on corporate litigation against U.S. firms. One branch of this literature examines the determinants of litigation risk (see, e.g., Dyl (1999), Simmons and Hoyt (1993) , Jones and Weingram (1996), Field, Lowry and Shu (2005) , and Gande and Lewis (2009)). Another branch examines the stock price reaction for lawsuit initiations (see, e.g. Romano (1991) , Bhagat, Brickley and Coles (1994) , Bizjak and Coles (1995) , Bhattacharya, Galpin and Haslem (2007) , Bhagat, Bizjak and Coles (1998) The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents our analysis of the determinants of private enforcement actions against foreign firms based on a Cox proportional hazards model. Section 4 summarizes the economic effects of private enforcement actions in terms of legal penalties, and market-imposed shareholder losses surrounding the filing dates of these lawsuits. Section 5 concludes.
Data Description
Our initial sample is comprised of 2,883 U.S. securities class action lawsuits filed against domestic and foreign firms that are drawn from a chronological listing available at the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse Website (http://securities.stanford.edu/comp-date.shtml) for the years 1996 through 2008.
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The sample is then restricted to 2,706 securities class action lawsuits on firms whose daily stock returns are included in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily returns file on the lawsuit filing date. To identify foreign firms, we first find firms whose two-digit share code (shrcd) in the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) begins with 3 or ends with 2. Table 1 compares the frequency of lawsuit filings on foreign firms with that of domestic firms. We find that 269 lawsuits were filed against 215 foreign firms, and the remaining 2,437 lawsuits were filed against 2,004 U.S. domestic firms. The number of companies is lower than the number of filings because some firms are sued multiple times. Table 1 also reports the percentage of firms being sued each year. Over the 1996 to 2008 time period, the percentage of foreign firms being sued is similar to that of U.S. firms (11.79% versus 13.80%, respectively).
Stated another way, we find that one in every eight foreign firms trading in the U.S. are sued at 8 All of these lawsuits were filed subsequent to the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). The intent of the PSLRA was to restrict frivolous securities class action lawsuits. least once during the 1996 to 2008 time period, compared to one in every seven U.S domestic firms. Moreover, the relative frequency of private enforcement actions against foreign firms as a percentage of the total U.S. private enforcement actions has steadily increased with time. Figure   1 illustrates that in 1996, lawsuits against foreign firms only represented approximately 6% of the total U.S. private securities class-action lawsuits, but by 2008 represented almost 14% of the total U.S. private enforcement activity. Table 1 and Figure 1 detail all foreign firms sued in the U.S. over our sample period. In our subsequent set of analyses, we require firm specific accounting and stock price data which reduces the sample to 251 lawsuits. Canadian firms had the highest number of lawsuits (50). Our comprehensive sample contains all lawsuits against foreign companies trading on major U.S. stock exchanges and therefore also includes 46 enforcement actions against firms that incorporate in tax havens such as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands.
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These not only include 33 formerly U.S. incorporated firms (e.g., Fruit of the Loom, Carnival Corporation, Global Crossing and Tyco International) but also 13 formerly non-U.S. incorporated firms (e.g., Nam Tai Electronics Inc., Fuwei Films Holdings Co Ltd, Chinadotcom Corporation and Asia Electronics Holding Company). Since these are legally non-U.S. companies we include them in our sample. However, in later tests we show that removing the observations from formerly U.S. incorporated firms leaves our results qualitatively unchanged.
Overall, the results in Tables 1 and 2 present evidence that U.S. securities law enforcement actions do take place against foreign firms. Moreover, enforcement actions against foreign firms occur almost as often as those against their U.S. counterparts. Therefore, our examination of private enforcement actions of U.S. securities laws suggest a much more vigorous level of U.S. securities laws enforcement against foreign firms than prior work which focused on public enforcement actions.
Determinants of Private Enforcement Actions against Foreign Firms
In this section, we examine the determinants of private enforcement actions against foreign firms. The propensity to be sued is estimated using factors that proxy for the size of potential damages, the litigation environment, and firm specific characteristics. We examine factors contained in previous U.S.-based research as well as investigate several new determinants that may be important for firms not headquartered in the United States. For example, we are especially interested in whether the amount of assets the foreign firm has in the U.S. as well as the foreign firms' home country legal environment affects the propensity to be sued (and in later tests, enforcement penalties). Prior research conjectures that firms located in poor investor protection countries and/or that have little assets of the U.S. may be less likely to be sued given investors may face substantial obstacles in recovering damages awarded to them by U.S. courts (see, e.g., Siegel 2005 , Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz 2004 , Reese and Weisbach 2002 . However, there is no direct evidence in the literature on this subject that we are aware of. An example of the argument that assets in the U.S. may matter to U.S. lawsuits comes from the prospectus for the Chinese company LDK Solar, which is incorporated in the Cayman Islands and traded on the NYSE.
10 "You will have limited ability to bring an action against us or against our directors and officers, or to enforce a judgment against us or them. We are incorporated in the Cayman Islands and conduct substantially all of our operations in China through our wholly owned subsidiary established in China. Most of our current directors and officers also reside outside the United States. Substantially all of our assets and the assets of those persons are located outside the United States. As a result, it may be difficult or impossible for you to bring an action against us or against these individuals in the United States, in the Cayman Islands or in China in the event that you believe that your rights have been infringed under the applicable securities laws or otherwise. Even if you are successful in bringing an action of this kind, the laws of the Cayman Islands and of China may render you unable to enforce a judgment against our assets or the assets of our directors and officers. For more information regarding the relevant laws of the Cayman Islands and China, see "Enforceability of Civil Liabilities" in this prospectus"
Discussion of explanatory variables U.S. based Assets:
We obtain two proxies for the extent of firms' U.S. presence from their geographic segment disclosures. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SAS) 131 requires firms provide a breakdown of material (10% or more) segments by geographic area. (2011), we find the vast majority of geographic segment reporting by our sample of non-U.S. firms is for sales rather than assets. 11 Therefore, our first proxy for the extent of U.S. presence is the log of their U.S. sales (log of u.s. sales). For firms that do not disclose segment sales, we assume that their sales are not material and code the variable as zero. For our sample of 251 sued firms, 130 reported zero U.S. sales while 121 reported positive U.S. sales.
Consistent with Gerakos, Piotroski and Srinivasan
10 From Form F-1 filed with the SEC on May 31, 2007. 11 Gerakos, Piotroski and Srinivasan (2011) note that asset based geographical data is provided with less frequency and more coarsely than geographic sales data and many non-U.S. firms report net assets (assets minus liabilities), not total identifiable assets, in their geographical segment reports. In our sample, only one firm reported material assets and not sales.
Since the 10% threshold may miss some foreign firms with a smaller U.S. presence, we also create a dummy variable (u.s. region dummy) that equals 1 if the firm discloses material sales or assets for any combined geographical region that contains the United States, such as North America, Americas, U.S/Canada, etc. For this expanded definition of U.S. presence, 49 of the 251 firms did not report any sales or assets for any region that could possibly contain the United States.
We verify the information for both measures by checking manually the individual 10-K and 20-F forms for firms that did not report U.S. or (U.S. regions) sales or assets or any other geographic segments (e.g., employees, operating profit, or equity in earnings in unconsolidated subsidiaries etc.) in the year prior to the lawsuit. Moreover, since prior to 2009, foreign issuers were allowed to omit segment reporting if the firm obtained a qualified audit report, we also gather data on the audit opinion of our sample of sued firms in order to verify that none of our sample firms availed themselves of this possible exemption.
12 Table 3 reports that sued firms have significantly more U.S. presence that the non-sued firms (for both proxies).
Size of Damage Awards:
We use several variables to proxy for the size of potential damage awards. In U.S. based research, the standard proxies for computing damage awards includes share turnover, past volatility, past returns, and firm size. Firms with high turnover are more likely to be sued since damages are an increasing function of the number of shares that trade at misleading prices (see, e.g. Dyl (1999), Simmons and Hoyt (1993) ). We follow Field, Lowry and Shu (2005) and calculate share turnover using the [-200,-51] estimation period prior to the lawsuit filing date that we use in our event study analysis described in Section 4.2.1. Table 3 reports that share turnover is higher for sued versus non-sued firms. Prior volatility and 12 We do not find any of our sample firms have qualified audit report. In 2008, the SEC eliminated this segment reporting relief noting that fewer than 10 foreign private issuers avail themselves of this accommodation. stock returns also have been shown to be associated with plaintiffs' incentives to file a lawsuit (Jones and Weingram, (1996) , Gande and Lewis (2009)). Table 3 shows that on average, prior stock returns measured over the same [-200, -51 ] estimation period preceding the lawsuit filing dates are -15.4% for sued firms and 5.3% for non-sued firms. We examine firm size since large firms have "deep pockets" to pay larger amounts to plaintiffs. Table 3 shows that sued firms are significantly larger than non-sued firms.
Litigation Environment: We also examine a number of factors that are related to the current litigation environment. These include measures of firm, industry and country litigation activity. Since a firm may be more likely to be sued if it has been sued in the past, we create a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm has been sued previously and 0 otherwise.
Since the frequency of litigation differs across industry, a second measure we employ for litigation intensity is the number of class-action lawsuits that have been filed against other foreign firms in the same four digit SIC code as the sued firm, measured over the same [-200,- 51] estimation period preceding the lawsuit filing date. To capture any potential non-linearities in this measure, we also include its squared term.
Country Level Legal Environment: Finally, we include several measures that proxy for the firms' home country legal environment. The association is not obvious, as firms from worse legal environments may be more likely to engage in activities that would violate U.S. securities laws. However, poor legal structures in the home country may also reduce the incentive to sue in the U.S. given the likelihood of collecting a judgment may be lower.
We use three commonly employed proxies for the home country legal environment. First, the anti-self-dealing index, a numerical measure of the intensity of regulation of selfdealing created by Djankov et al. (2008) , covering both public and private enforcement. This measure reflects the strength of minority shareholder protection against corporate self-dealing by the controlling shareholder. Second, the Spamann Anti-director Rights Index (Spamann ADRI) which measures the strength of shareholder protection. The original ADRI, an index of shareholder protection rules was created by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). Spamann (2010) highlights several shortcomings of this measure and constructs an improved measure which we refer to as "Spamann ADRI" in this paper. Third, the revised ADRI of Djankov et al. (2008) who also improves the original ADRI. Table 3 reports that sued firms have higher incidence of being previously sued, are more likely to have been in an industry that has higher litigation intensity and generally come from countries with less protective shareholder laws.
Parameter Estimates of the Propensity to be Sued Model
We use the Cox proportional hazards regression model (Cox (1972) ) to make inferences about the probability that a firm will be sued on that day. The hazard rate in the model is the instantaneous rate of being sued. In our analysis, we allow for multiple failures, i.e., a firm may be sued more than once during the sample period. 13 The model assumes that the hazard rate for firm j, h(t|x j ), is a function of the independent variables, x j , and is written as
where β x is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. The hazard rate in equation (1) is composed of two separate parts. The first part, h 0 (t), is called the baseline hazard. It is obtained by setting x equal to zero so that the baseline hazard for firm j corresponds to the hazard rate with x j set to zero. The Cox model is a semi-parametric model in that β x is estimated without specifying the baseline hazard; that is, the model makes no assumptions about the nature or shape of the hazard rate.
14 The second part, exp(x j β x ) is called the relative hazard, and is a function of explanatory variables. The model is proportional in that the hazard rate is obtained by shifting the baseline hazard as the explanatory variables change. For example, firm j's hazard rate is a multiplicative transformation of firm i's hazard rate. Therefore, the model assumes that, whatever the shape of the baseline hazard, it is the same for all firms.
The Cox proportional hazards model in equation (1) is estimated by maximizing the "partial" likelihood function. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering across firms, so that we assume errors are independent across firms, but not across time. Table 4 provides parameter estimates for the Cox proportional hazard lawsuit model that combines potential damages, litigation environment and firm specific factors. Across all models, we find that firms that are more likely to have higher damage awards are more likely to be sued.
For example, we find that firms with high share turnover and high stock volatility are more likely to be sued. In addition, larger firms are more likely to be sued, which supports the "deep pockets" hypothesis. All of these variables are statistically significant at the 1% level.
We also find that the litigation environment impacts the propensity to be sued. As expected, firms that were sued before, and firms that are in industries where lawsuits on other foreign firms occurred recently are more likely to be sued. There also is some evidence that firms from weaker legal regimes are more likely to be targeted. The coefficient on the Spamann ADRI is negative and significant (Model 2), though the coefficient on the anti-self dealing index (Model 1) and the Revised ADRI (Model 3) are insignificant. In addition, Table 4 shows some evidence that foreign firms with a larger U.S. presence are more likely to be targeted for private enforcement actions. For example, the coefficient on log of u.s. sales is positive and significant in Models 1-3 that include country legal regime proxies, though is insignificant in Model 4 that replaces the country legal controls with country fixed effects. However, when we employ the expanded definition of U.S. presence with country fixed effects (Model 6), the u.s. region dummy is positive and significant.
As a robustness check, Model 5 excludes the former U.S. incorporated firms and finds similar results. In addition, we also run the propensity to be sued model as a probit model rather than as a Cox proportional hazards model, reported in Table 5 , and obtain results that are similar to that of the hazard model.
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Overall, the findings show that several of the determinants of the likelihood of being sued for foreign firms are similar to those for U.S. firms which suggest that foreign firms are in many ways targeted for enforcement actions like U.S. firms. Further, while there is some evidence that foreign firms with more U.S. sales are more likely to be sued, it is important to note that 130 of the 251 sued firms in our sample have immaterial U.S. sales, indicating that enforcement actions are also prevalent for firms without a significant U.S. presence.
The Economic Effects of Private Enforcement Actions of U.S. Securities Laws
Legal penalties Imposed on Firms
To assess the economic importance of private enforcement actions against foreign firms, we first examine the legal penalties imposed on firms, since private class-action lawsuits may result in court settlements related to the charges of securities law violations. We gather data on the resolution of our shareholder lawsuit sample. Vivendi shareholders that resulted in a judgment estimated to be worth over $9 billion, an amount larger than any previous U.S. securities case (foreign or domestic). However, on To estimate the importance of these legal penalties imposed on firms, we next collect data on the amounts targeted firms agreed to pay to settle the class-action lawsuits against them.
Of the 139 lawsuits that were settled, we were able to identify the settlement amounts for 130
cases. Table 7 reports that 19 settlements or 14.62% were for amounts between $25 million and $100 million for a total of $943.85 million. There were 3 settlements for amounts between $100 million and $1 billion and 3 settlements in excess of $1 billion. In total, the 130 enforcement actions resulted in approximately $9 billion in settlements. Overall, the evidence contained in Tables 7 and 8 from court settlements suggests that foreign firms face the prospect of significant penalties when they are targeted for securities law violations in the United States. Coffee (2006) argues that corporations cannot afford to insure its insiders for billions of dollars, therefore the results suggest a deterrent effect given the prospect that direct and indirect costs associated with securities class action lawsuits can exceed insiders gains to securities fraud. Furthermore, the fact that these cases were settled suggests that foreign firms are indeed willing to pay significant penalties even though they are not headquartered in the U.S.
Share Value Effects of Private Enforcement Actions against Foreign Firms
In this section, we examine the valuation effects of private enforcement actions against foreign firms. As Bhagat and Romano (2002a,b) argue, enforcement events convey information to the market about the violation and its cost to the firm. In this way, our event study results allow us to investigate whether U.S. private enforcement actions actually matter to the shareholders of non-U.S. firms. If penalties assessed by U.S. courts are not enforceable against non-U.S. firms, the costs borne by shareholders will be minimal. If, on the other hand, the direct and indirect penalties associated with U.S. private enforcement actions are economically significant to foreign firms' shareholders, they will be reflected in the stock price reaction to the announcement of U.S. securities class-action lawsuits.
We measure abnormal returns using the foreign firm's U.S. traded share price. In later tests, we also show that our results are robust when we measure abnormal returns using local (non-U.S.) traded shares for the subset of our sample firms that are dual listed in the U.S and their local market. Focusing on short windows around the lawsuit filing date undoubtedly underestimates the total valuation loss for the average sample firm, but allows us to document that even under this conservative measurement, the penalties assessed by the market are large.
Empirical Method
We follow an event study methodology and measure the share price response to the lawsuit filing date over the event period using a two-factor market model as the pricing benchmark. Daily abnormal returns are computed as the actual return minus the two-factor model predicted return:
where , is the rate of return on stock j over day t, , is the corresponding rate of return on our first factor, namely CRSP's value-weighted index (of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks) on day t, and , is the corresponding rate of return on our second factor, namely the homemarket value-weighted index (measured in U.S. dollar terms) from Datastream.
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The coefficients , and are ordinary least squares estimates of firm j's two-factor model parameters. Abnormal returns are based on the two-factor model parameter estimates over the 150 trading day period from day -200 to day -51 where day 0 is the lawsuit filing date. For the lawsuit filed against firm j, we estimate the filing date effect by cumulating abnormal returns (CARs) in the usual manner over the event window , , which we denote as , ,
i.e.,
, ,
We evaluate the statistical significance of these CARs using the methodology of Mikkelson and Partch (1986) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional dependence in returns.
We perform news searches for confounding events surrounding the lawsuit filing date and eliminate firms with confounding events such as earnings announcements, merger announcements, asset sales, security issuance and top management turnover during the three day lawsuit filing window. During the three-day window, all of the lawsuit filing dates occurred outside of the trigger date (the date when the impropriety is announced, such as misstated earnings). Therefore, these losses in shareholder wealth present the most conservative estimate in that they almost certainly underestimate the total penalties associated with U.S. private enforcement actions since the market reaction to the trigger event will also contain information regarding the probability of a future class-action lawsuit. Therefore, we also follow Gande and Lewis (2009) and cumulate returns over several longer windows to estimate these effects. Table 9 reports the event study results for the abnormal returns surrounding the filing dates of the 186 shareholder lawsuits. During the three-day window surrounding the lawsuit filing date, shareholders of target firms experienced a mean (median) -6.16% (-2.15%) abnormal return, and a majority (69%) of firms experienced a negative abnormal return. All of these estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. When we cumulate returns over a longer window, we find that shareholder losses are even more negative. Over the estimation [-10, +1] window, we see the mean (median) shareholder abnormal returns are -15.67% (-5.80%) and statistically significant (both parametrically and nonparametrically) at the 1% level.
Event Study Results
To further gauge the economic significance of these results, Table 10 presents the magnitude in dollars of the economic penalties borne by shareholders of the U.S. traded equity.
To compute this, we first convert daily abnormal returns into an estimate of the economic dollar effect for each event. The daily economic dollar effect for firm j at date t is computed as
where , is the market capitalization of firm j's equity on date t-1. We calculate the market capitalization by multiplying the share price with the number of shares outstanding as of the lawsuit filing date. We obtain the closing share price a day prior to the lawsuit filing date from CRSP daily stock files. The number of shares outstanding as of the lawsuit filing date is obtained from Compustat annual files, i.e., as of prior financial year-end relative to the lawsuit filing date.
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Daily economic dollar effects are cumulated over the event window to determine the cumulative economic effect. For example, the cumulative economic effect, , for firm j and lawsuit i over [τ1, τ2] is computed as:
18 While CRSP daily files also contain shares outstanding variable (SHROUT), that variable is problematic since CRSP records the shares outstanding only for the security, not the total for the company, e.g., shares outstanding for American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are the shares outstanding of the ADR, not the underlying issue. Further, conversations with CRSP suggested that these numbers are self-reported from the exchanges and can be unreliable because of way flow back between local and ADR shares are handled. To get around this problem, we use shares outstanding variable (CSHO) from annual data files of Compustat which is not susceptible to this issue. Overall, the results in Table 10 show that the market imposes large economic penalties on foreign firms that are the targets of private enforcement actions of U.S. securities laws.
Therefore, in contrast to previous research that examined public enforcement actions by the SEC, our results from private enforcement actions suggest that not only are foreign firms often the targets of enforcement actions, but also that the penalties assessed by the market are economically severe.
Cross-Sectional Differences in Stock Price Reactions
In this section, we present univariate and multivariate examinations of the stock price reaction to private securities law enforcement actions. We test the hypothesis that foreign firms without a material presence in the U.S. are immune to U.S. enforcement actions. In addition, we also examine the extent to which formerly U.S. incorporated firms now based in tax haven countries affect our results.
In the univariate analysis, we first group firms by their extent of U.S. presence using our two proxies to investigate the market penalty for violating securities laws as a function of the firm's presence in the U.S. Next, firms are grouped by their country of incorporation's tax haven status to investigate the role, if any, formerly U.S. incorporated firms have on the results. Table   11 reports the results.
Panel A1 of Table 11 presents the univariate analysis of cumulative abnormal returns around the lawsuit filing date for firms with and without U.S. sales. The 87 foreign firms that had no reported sales in the U.S. experienced a statistically significant mean (median) abnormal return of -6.67% (-2.44%). The 99 foreign firms that had positive U.S. sales experienced a statistically significant mean (median) abnormal return of -5.72% (-1.92%). Panel A2 reports results for firms by whether they report material sales or assets in any region that could contain the United States. Using the expanded definition, we see that of the 32 firms that did not report sales or assets in any region that could possibly contain the U.S., the three day mean (median) stock price reaction was -7.00% (-4.50%). The 154 firms that disclosed positive sales or assets for a region that could contain the U.S. experienced a three day mean (median) stock price reaction of -5.99% (-1.97%). Therefore, the results from Panels A1 and A2 suggest that even foreign firms with little to no U.S. presence are penalized severely by the market when accused of U.S. securities law violations.
While formerly U.S. incorporated firms that have reincorporated in tax havens such as
Bermuda are legally non-US entities, our results would have potentially less meaning for the bonding hypothesis if they were substantially driven by these formerly U.S. incorporated firms.
To investigate this, panel B of Table 11 presents the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the lawsuit filing date for firms grouped by their country of incorporation's tax haven status.
During the three-day period surrounding the lawsuit filing date, the 150 foreign firms not incorporated in tax haven countries had a statistically significant mean (median) abnormal return of -6.18% (-2.15%). The 36 foreign firms that reincorporated in tax haven countries experienced a statistically significant mean (median) abnormal return of -6.10% (-2.32%). Of the 36 foreign firms incorporated in tax haven countries, 25 are formerly U.S. incorporated firms. These firms experienced a statistically significant mean (median) abnormal return of -5.08% (-1.92%). For completeness, we also report in Table 11 the remaining 11 non-US firms that are incorporated in tax haven countries experienced a mean (median) abnormal return of -8.40% (-2.91%).
Therefore, the univariate results suggest that the penalty imposed by the market for firms accused of violating U.S. securities laws is not only significant for firms without assets located in the U.S., but is also significant across the countries of incorporation.
To test whether the penalties associated with private enforcement actions of U.S.
securities laws are significant for firms without assets in the U.S. and across countries of incorporation, Table 12 presents a multivariate analysis. Following Gande and Lewis (2009), the dependent variable is the filing date announcement effect over the (-10, +1) event window and we include proxies for the size of potential damages, the litigation environment and firm specific characteristics employed in Table 4 . Models 1-3 include proxies for country legal variables while Models 4-6 include country fixed effects. Consistent with our univariate results, Table 12 shows that the coefficient on log of u.s. sales (e.g. Model 4) as well as the coefficient on u.s.
region dummy (Model 6) are insignificant. Therefore, even controlling for the determinants of lawsuit penalties, firms with little presence in the U.S. face severe economic penalties when they are targets of U.S. securities law violations. 
Robustness: Local Market Stock Price Reaction
Of our 251 sample firms, 152 are dual listed in the U.S. and in their home market. These firms include ADRs as well as Canadian firms with both local and U.S. traded shares.
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While arbitrage between markets would suggest the share price changes would be similar across markets (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010), a potential concern is that somehow shares trading in local market do not react to the initiation of a private enforcement action. Further, given there is no reliable way to measure the exact number of U.S. traded shares versus locally traded shares, finding a negative stock price reaction for the U.S. traded shares does not necessarily mean these losses are economically a large portion of firm value if prices between the local market and U.S.
market diverge. Therefore, we investigate this issue by measuring abnormal returns in the local market surrounding the lawsuit filing date using our prior multifactor model. For the 152 dual listed firms, daily stock price data is available from Datastream for 85 firms. Table 13 presents the results. During the three day -1 to +1 event window, the local market shares experienced a mean decrease in shareholder value of 4.78% (significant at the 1% level) and a median decrease in shareholder value of 0.96% (significant at the 5% level). Over the -10 to +1 window, the mean (median) change in shareholder value was -12.56% (-1.07%), which are both significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the local market shares also experience a significant decrease in shareholder value upon the initiation of a private class action securities lawsuit. Taken together with the result that the non-dual listed firms in our sample have all of their equity trading the 19 The remaining firms public equity trades only in the U.S.
U.S., the evidence suggests that the wealth destruction affects the majority of the firm's equity value.
Additional Robustness Tests
To ensure that our results are not influenced by frivolous lawsuits, we follow Dyck,
Morse and Zingales (2010) and conduct two additional robustness tests: First, we exclude all cases in which the judicial review process lead to a case's dismissal. Second, we exclude cases where the settlement was less than $3 million, a payment level that is generally understood to separate meritorious suits from frivolous ones. We continue to find economically and statistically significant negative filing date announcement effects in each of these instances.
Gande and Lewis (2009) present evidence that many of the lawsuits are partially anticipated, and that shareholders capitalize losses prior to a firm being sued. We re-run our analysis in Table 12 using a dependent variable that includes both the filing date announcement effect and the extent of shareholder losses partially anticipated and hence capitalized prior to the lawsuit filing date. We continue to find that even after controlling for determinants of lawsuit penalties, firms with little presence in the U.S. face severe economic penalties when they are targets of U.S. securities law violations.
Conclusion
While a large literature documents that stronger investor protection laws lead to better economic outcomes, the inherent difficulty in changing a country's legal system has led many researchers to argue that cross listing in the United States provides an effective substitute.
However, there exists little evidence that securities laws are actually enforced against foreign firms. If anything, the literature suggests that public enforcement by the SEC is rare and often results in insignificant penalties, which has led to substantial debate on the efficacy of marketbased solutions to improve corporate governance.
In this paper, we provide the first analysis of the economic impact of private enforcement actions of U.S. securities laws against foreign firms via class-action lawsuits. We document that 269 class-action lawsuits alleging violation of U.S. securities laws were filed against foreign firms over the 1996 to 2008 period. We find not only that the percentage of firms being sued is nearly equal to that of U.S. firms but it is also increasing through time. We find that firms from 36 countries have been targeted for securities violation lawsuits and also provide some evidence that firms with poor legal protection of minority shareholders as well as those with more assets located in the U.S. are more likely to be sued.
We also document the severity of penalties imposed on foreign firms that are caught violating U.S. securities laws. We find that while lawsuit settlements imposed on firms are sometimes large, the monetary penalties imposed by the market are substantially larger. Our most conservative estimates show that using the three-day announcement period surrounding the lawsuit filing date, there is a significant negative stock price reaction of -6.16% which translates to an average loss of $392 million dollars. Aggregating over all firms, the total dollar loss is $73 billion dollars. Overall, our results provide evidence that private enforcement actions of U.S.
securities laws are neither uncommon nor economically insignificant.
TABLE 1 Frequency of Shareholder Lawsuits
This table segments firms into domestic and foreign firms (see Appendix A for details of this classification), and provides a comparison of the incidence of lawsuits against both firm types. Firms that are sued multiple times during the sample period are only counted once in this 6  7  1998  0  1  3  10  14  1999  0  2  1  9  12  2000  1  6  0  8  15  2001  1  11  16  16  44  2002  7  5  4  6  22  2003  14  0  2  10  26  2004  9  2  5  14  30  2005  3  1  5  9  18  2006  2  1  3  3  9  2007  4  1 
TABLE 4 Hazard Model Estimation
The dependent variable is equal to one if a firm is sued and zero otherwise. The independent variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) variance-covariance matrix, and clustering of firm effects. The sample period is 1996-2008. Superscripts * , * * and * * * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
(1) The dependent variable for the 186 shareholder lawsuits that are not subject to confounding events is the filing date announcement effect over the event window (−10, +1). The independent variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) variance-covariance matrix. The sample period is 1996-2008. Superscripts * , * * and * * * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
(1) 
FIGURE 1 Lawsuit Filings Against Foreign Firms
This figure presents the number of lawsuit filings against foreign firms and against domestic firms. This figure also depicts the number of lawsuit filings against foreign firms as a percent of total filings (i.e., sum of filings against foreign firms and filings against domestic firms). The sample period for our study is 1996-2008. 
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